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I. INTRODUCTION**
Relations between the European Community (EC or Community)
* The author received a J.D. from Florida State University in 1991 and an
L.L.M. from the Free University of Brussels in 1992. He is currently practicing law in
Miami, Florida, with the law firm of Starkman & Magolnick, P.A. The author wishes
to express his gratitude to Ms. Rachel Barlow and Messrs. Erik Bertelsen, Fraser Mc-
Kie, and Brian Raley for their counsel and patience as the author bombarded them
with paragraph after paragraph during the first draft. The author also wishes to thank
Mr. Eduardo Cruz for his tireless efforts. His editorial skill is unparalleled.
** Mr. Marko researched and wrote this article while in Europe and obtained
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and the states that once comprised the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) have changed substantially since the 1960s.1
While EC-CMEA relations had progressed from a relationship of hos-
tility and distrust to a relationship of mutual respect and freer trade,'
the events of the last three years have made that beneficial evolution
irrelevant. The brushfire of revolt that blazed through the Eastern Eu-
ropean landscape in the autumn of 1989 ended an era. The crumbling
of the Berlin Wall and the downfall of the Communist regimes that
had tyrannized Eastern and Central Europe for fifty years produced
upheaval that staggered the globe. Consequently, even the most basic
premises and policies undergirding Community-Soviet Bloc relations
became obsolete and demanded change.3 As a result, there was an
awakening to the notion that if democratization and market economies
were to take root in Eastern and Central Europe, the West would have
to undertake costly efforts."
New assumptions brought forth a new regime of legal, administra-
tive, and financial initiatives to link former adversaries. This article
reviews and analyzes one part of the constellation of Community pro-
grams and arrangements: trade with Central and Eastern Europe.
First, as a background, this article reviews the Community's trading
some of the information contained herein while working on his L.L.M. degree.
1. For a review of relations between the CMEA and the Community prior to the
fall of communism in Eastern Europe see generally THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EAST-
ERN EUROPE (Mark Maresceau, ed. 1989) [hereinafter TRADE RELATIONS].
2. CMEA foreign policy had taken a dramatic shift by 1988 as evidenced by a
report on the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Official Rela-
tions between the European Economic Community and the Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance:
Normalization of relations opens the way to increased trade and greater con-
tact with a group, which had long chosen to ignore the existence of the Com-
munity. This development is part of the broader process of improving East-
West relations witnessed in recent years, reflecting a more open and more
realistic external policy on the part of the Eastern European countries and
real efforts to reform the economic management system.
BULL. EUR. COMM. (Commission), No. 6, 1988, at 13-14; see also Joint Declaration,
Council Decision 88/345/EEC, 1990 O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 157) 35.
3. See GILES MERRITT, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR: THE CHALLENGE OF
FREEDOM 13 (1991).
4. JOZEF M. VAN BRABANT, REMAKING EASTERN EUROPE: ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF TRANSITION 85 (1990).
5. See David Kennedy & David E. Webb, Integration: Eastern Europe and the
European Economic Communities, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 633, 633 (1990). The
most notable non-EC Western states involved with the Community's efforts in Eastern
Europe are Japan and the United States.
REVIEW OF MARKET ACCESS
regime, which is articulated through the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). Second, this article provides an analysis of the
elimination and suspension of the various quantitative restrictions his-
torically imposed against the former Communist Bloc. Third, this arti-
cle examines the Generalized System of Preferences, the Community's
scheme for providing favorable trade to developing countries, as it ap-
plies to Central and Eastern Europe. Fourth, this article reviews the
Community's trade and association agreements with the East Bloc, be-
ginning with the early sectoral arrangements and culminating in the
current generation of Europe Agreements.
This article does not attempt to cover all of the nations that com-
prised the now defunct East Bloc, but instead focuses on Albania, Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Nations not
covered include the Commonwealth of Independent States (former
USSR or CIS), the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), Yu-
goslavia, and the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia).
There are several reasons for omitting a discussion of these nations. For
example, with respect to the CIS, there was no substantial coordinated
assistance until 1992.6 Furthermore, the inclusion of the CIS would be
unwieldy as it is comprised of a dozen countries-not one. Thus, a dis-
cussion of the CIS would best be treated as an article unto itself. This
article does not analyze the former GDR because there was no evolu-
tion in coordinated assistance after the GDR became part of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG) and the European Community.7 Yu-
goslavia is not included because of two reasons. Most importantly,
Yugoslavia no longer exists as a nation-state. Consequently, the Com-
munity now recognizes the independence of the several republics that
once were part of Yugoslavia and the EC member states no longer have
diplomatic relations with the former Belgrade-based federal govern-
ment.' Coordinated assistance to the area is no longer available and
there is no timetable for its return. Furthermore, Yugoslavia has never
been considered part of the Soviet Bloc states, which are the focus of
this paper. Finally, this article does not include the Baltics because,
6. Actually, the Community took its first financing decisions with regard to the
former USSR on December 11, 1991. However, all the projects funded were for 1992.
This represented the first coordinated Western financial assistance to this region. Press
Release, E.C. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE USSR: 1991 PROGRAMME, at 1,
(EC-DG I-TACIS) (December 11, 1991).
7. See generally Jochen A. Frowein, Current Developments: The Reunification of
Germany, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 152-156 (1992).
8. A. Riding, EC Member States Will Recall Ambassadors to Belgrade, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 12, 1992, at 1.
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until recently, they were treated as part of the CIS and were not in-
cluded in what has become known as Central and Eastern European
coordinated assistance. Again, these states are better analyzed in a dif-
ferent article.
II. MARKET ACCESS
The European Community's approach to trade with Eastern and
Central Europe has recently focused on facilitating the growth of free
market economies. The cornerstone of this approach has been the elim-
ination of commercial and legal barriers to the importation of goods
into the Community. This article identifies and analyzes the steps taken
by the Community towards opening markets to the East since the
break up of the former Soviet Bloc.
A. Background
Before understanding the trade relationship that has recently un-
folded between the Community and its Eastern partners, it is important
to understand the legal foundation of that relationship. The starting
point is the Treaty of Rome.9 Article 113 of the Treaty 0 grants the
Community exclusive authority to establish a Common Commercial
Policy." Under this policy, the member states cannot independently
impose tariffs or quantitative restrictions on foreign products.12 As
such, the Community customarily imposes trade restrictions.
While the EC decides the Common Commercial Policy, it is ar-
ticulated through GATT.13 The Common Commercial Policy must,
therefore, be compatible with GATT."' The general rule of GATT is
9. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March 25
1957, art. 113, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EEC
TREATY].
10. Id.
11. The relevant portion provides:
[T]he common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, par-
ticularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and
trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization,
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case
of dumping or subsidies.
id.
12. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 638.
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature 30 Oct. 1947,
61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
14. The European Community is not, as such, a contracting party to the GATT.
But it speaks for its member states, which are all signatories. The transfer of jurisdic-
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that signatory states are granted "most favored nation" (MFN) trading
status.15 Thus, with regard to any custom duties, the method of impos-
ing those duties, and the rules of import and export, "any advantage,
favor, privilege or immunity" given to any contracting party must be
given to all contracting parties."' This policy prevents trade discrimina-
tion by GATT members against each other. It favors development of
trade and leads to suspension or reduction of tariffs and non-tariffs bar-
riers (e.g., quantitative restrictions).
Of all Central and Eastern Europe's former Communist countries,
only Czechoslovakia is an original contracting party. Over time, how-
ever, Poland (1967), Romania (1971), and Hungary (1973) acceded to
the agreement.1" Albania and Bulgaria 8 are not yet contracting
parties.
Non-GATT members are not eligible as a matter of right- to the
benefits of the agreement and must fend for themselves in the world of
international trade.' 9 Although Poland, Romania, and Hungary ac-
ceded to the GATT, the Community did not extend the basic GATT
advantages to them. Their protocols of accession to the GATT included
language that permits them to be treated in such a way that they effec-
tively fall outside the GATT framework.20 Meanwhile, states that had
not signed onto the GATT at all received only those trade opportunities
that the Community was willing to extend. As such, both GATT and
non-GATT Eastern and Central Europeans countries had been treated
essentially the same. 21
However, the recent political and economic developments in East-
ern and Central Europe have resulted in a new approach to trade be-
tion for its members is grounded in the common commercial policy. Article 115 of the
Treaty gives the EC the authority to negotiate trade agreements with third countries on
behalf of the member states. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 115.
15. Id.
16. GATT, supra note 13, art. 1(1).
17. Guy L. de Lacharri~re, The Legal Framework for International Trade, in
TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE 108 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers ed., 1987).
18. Bulgaria has been an observer at GATT meetings since 1967 and petitioned
for full membership in 1986. VAN BRABANT, supra note 4, at 95.
19. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 639.
20. See GATT, BAsIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 46-52 [hereinaf-
ter B.I.S.D.] (15th Supp. 1968) (Hungary); B.I.S.D. at 5-10 (18th Supp. 1972)
(Romania); B.I.S.D. at 3-8 (20th Supp. 1974) (Poland). Article 4 of each protocol of
accession includes language that allows another contracting party to derogate from
MFN treatment.
21. "In the case of Czechoslovakia, who is an original signatory, there is no such
explicit legal foundation for the imposition of quantitative restrictions." Kennedy &
Webb, supra note 5, at 641.
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tween the former Communist states and their Community counter-
parts. More favorable trade treatment has placed many of the former
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance2 within the
GATT framework. Thus, understanding some basic rules of GATT is
essential to this discussion.
As indicated above, MFN status normally governs relations under
the GATT; however, there are exceptions. First, the GATT allows cer-
tain identified developing countries to be treated more favorably than
even the most favored nations. 3 This preferential status is called the
"generalized system of preferences" (GSP), and is designed to assist
the poorer nations of the world-the lesser developed countries of the
third world.2 4
Second, the GATT permits derogations from MFN with regard to
state-trading countries (e.g., the former East Bloc). 5 These planned
economies centrally determine costs and prices, provide artificially low
foreign exchange rates, establish foreign trade monopolies, impose bur-
densome import authorization schemes, and conduct other forms of
trade discrimination. The non-tariff barriers are permitted to amelio-
rate the inherent unfairness of these mechanisms.
Third, the GATT allows for free trade agreements or "interim-
agreements" setting up timetables for tariff elimination and economic
integration.2" Members of these trade agreements are exempt from the
MFN provision that requires a member state to provide the same free
trade conditions to all GATT parties.2 7 This provision reflects the
GATT's recognition that closer integration of economies through trade
agreements is consistent with the overall goal of unfettered trade.28
22. See supra notes 1-2 and, accompanying text.
23. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 638.
24. Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Doc. L/3545 (June 25, 1971), re-
printed in B.I.S.D., supra note 20.
25. GATT, supra note 13, art. XVII.
26. Id. art. XXIV.
27. Id. preamble. One could argue that this is repugnant to the GATT; how could
the MFN clause operate with such a huge exception? However, these deviations are
permitted on the theory that while free trade agreements are discriminatory against
those who are not participating in the free trade area, they are consistent with the
ultimate goal of the GATT-the eventual elimination of trade barriers.
28. Members of the GATT have resolved to meet their "objectives by entering
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce." Id.
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B. Quantitative Restrictions
The Community traditionally applies two types of quantitative re-
strictions: non-specific quantitative restrictions and specific quantitative
restrictions.
The Community's non-specific quantitative restrictions are set
forth in Council Regulation 288/82 which was promulgated in 1982.29
These restrictions can apply to any country, regardless of the political
economy of origin-whether state-trade or free market. Council Regu-
lation 288/82 functions in two ways. To begin with, the regulation enu-
merates a list of products which are prohibited from entering the Com-
munity's economic space.30 Generally, specific member states imposed
these restrictions prior to their entry into the EC.31 These restrictions
were "grandfathered" into the common trade policy and the Council
eventually will eliminate them. 2 The Council Regulation also creates a
flexible scheme for imposing future restrictions. The Commission limits
access to the EC market when "a product is imported into the Commu-
nity in such greatly increased quantities and/or such terms or condi-
tions as to cause, or threaten to cause, substantial injury to Community
producers of like or directly competing products . . . ."' These limita-
tions have a three month life span, absent subsequent action by the
Council. 4
There is no list of countries whose products are automatically
blocked. There is, however, an annex (annex I) to the regulation that
lists certain products which are either partially restricted or barred.
This list applies to a country, a group of countries, or a geographical
zone, depending on the specific restriction.3 5 Furthermore, when protec-
tive measures are imposed pursuant to the regulation, they can be
country specific. For example, there has been a Community sensitivity
towards Japanese cars and the Community has traditionally imposed
limitations on their imports.36 Alternatively, the EC might impose a
Community-wide quota. This, however, is unlikely outside highly sensi-
29. Council Regulation 288/82, 1982 O.J. (L 35) 1.
30. Id.
31. .id.
32. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 639.
33. Council Regulation 288/82, supra note 29, art. 15(6).
34. If the Commission fails to submit the proposal to the Council the member
state(s) may continue to restrict imports on an interim basis or in compliance with a
bilateral agreement with the affected third country. Id. art. 17.
35. Id. annex I.
36. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 639 n.19.
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tive sectors, such as steel and textiles.37
The Community's specific quantitative restrictions originate from
Council Regulations 1765/82 and 3420/83.8 Specific quantitative re-
strictions function differently than the non-specific type. Most signifi-
cantly, specific quantitative restrictions apply only to state-traders-in
other words, the former East Bloc. 9 These restrictions stem from a
historical intolerance towards products from planned economies. This
general intolerance is grounded not in an outright rejection of state-run
economies, but in the nature of the Community, which is only suited to
trade in which costs and prices are determined by purely market situa-
tions. Brussels, thus, historically allowed its member states to restrict
significantly imports from these state traders.
Another difference is that specific quantitative restrictions are far
more limiting than non-specific restrictions. A non-specific quantitative
restriction starts from the premise that all imports are allowed and
then sets-off those products that are to be restricted-a positive liberal-
ization scheme. By contrast, a specific quantitative restriction starts
from the premise that all products from state-trading countries are ex-
cluded and then identifies what products are allowed into the Commu-
nity and in what amount-a negative liberalization scheme.
The negative liberalization scheme allows for the imposition of a
relatively large number of specific quantitative restrictions.4" The list of
products is exhaustive. It includes virtually every type of product that
is currently produced by the Community, from iron to baby gar-
ments.41 The scheme reflects the notion that products from the East
Bloc, regardless of the sector from which they come, are damaging to
the Community's own producers. Obviously, the specific quantitative
scheme is significantly more hostile to free trade than its non-specific
counterpart.
The downfall of the East Bloc communist regimes brought the
downfall of quantitative restrictions imposed against these countries.
There are three council regulations that codify this trade liberaliza-
37. Id. at 640.
38. Council Regulation 1765/82, 1982 O.J. (L 195) 1; Council Regulation 3420/
83, 1983 O.J. (L 346) 6.
39. The Community has never defined "state-trading countries," but has identified
the CMEA (save Cuba), Albania, North Korea, and China as state-trading countries.
See Council Regulation 3420/83, supra note 38, at 6; Council Regulation 1765/82
supra note 38, at 1.
40. Council Regulation 3420/83, supra note 38, at 6.
41. Id. annex II.
[Vol. 17
REVIEW OF MARKET ACCESS
tion. 2 The first two were adopted in November and December 1989.43
These regulations involved only Poland and Hungary because they were
the only two countries that were part of the PHARE" aid program at
that time. The regulations themselves permanently abolished specific
quantitative restrictions and suspended non-specific quantitative restric-
tions against Polish and Hungarian imports. 5 However, in September
1990, Council Regulation 2727/90 subsequently replaced those two
regulations.4  Council Regulation 2727/90 extended the same liberal-
izations granted to Poland and Hungary to most of their Eastern and
Central European partners. The only restrictions that remain are on
products reserved from Regulation 288/82, as well as on textiles and
steel-specific sectors that the Community traditionally protects."" In
theory at least, the EC could partially or completely revoke its suspen-
sion of non-specific quantitative restrictions. That is unlikely to occur,
as such revocation would contradict the Community's goal of trans-
forming the former East Bloc.
Interestingly, the elimination of specific qualitative restrictions
forced the suspension of non-specific quantitative restrictions. Because
non-specific quantitative restrictions are applicable to any nation, when
the Community abolished Council Regulations 1765/82 and 3420/83
(state-trading restrictions) the Central and Eastern European states
42. Council Regulation 3381/89, 1989 O.J. (L 326) 6; Council Regulation 3691/
89, 1989 O.J. (L 362) 1.
43. Id.
44. PHARE is a Community-coordinated aid programme designed to provide as-
sistance to the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Com-
munity provides aid for critical sectors of the economy like agriculture, industry, invest-
ment, energy, training, environmental protection, and trade and services. Council
Regulation 3906/89, art. 3(1) 1989 O.J. (L 375). Essentially, this is accomplished by
providing funds and technical assistance to the Central and Eastern Europeans for spe-
cific projects. See Commission, PHARE: Assistance for Economic Restructuring in the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe - An Operational Guide 10 (Commission
Document, Catalogue No. CC-71-91-493-EN-C) (1992).
45. It should be noted that the relaxation of non-quantitative restrictions did not
apply to Spain and Portugal. Their respective protocols of accession into the EC re-
quired that they not be placed in a position where any other country gains greater
trade advantages with the Community. Thus, special care was taken to protect the two
Iberian states. Otherwise, the liberalization of non-specific quotas would have placed
Poland and Hungary (and eventually all the Central and Eastern Europeans) in a bet-
ter trading position than Spain and Portugal. Mark Maresceau, The European Com-
munity and Eastern Europe and the USSR, in THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EC:
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE IN 1992 14 (J. Redmond ed., 1991).
46. Council Regulation 2727/90, 1990 O.J. (L 262) 11.
47. Council Regulation 288/82, supra note 29, annex I; Council Regulation
2727/90, supra note 46, at 12.
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were automatically shifted over to Council Regulation 288/82. This
shift compelled the Community to suspend the application of 288/82 to
the former Communist states. Otherwise, these states would have been
subject to non-specific restrictions, which would have been contrary to
the policy of providing immediate market access for the East Bloc.
As a result, the Eastern and Central European states are actually
in a better position than most of the Community's other global trading
partners.' 8 This result raises the question of whether the new arrange-
ment is inconsistent with the GATT. If the former East Bloc Countries
are given greater access to the Community's market than other GATT
members, such a result would appear to be a violation of the MFN
clause which provides that no GATT member be treated differently
from any other GATT member.4 9
C. The Generalized System of Preferences
One of the most useful tools in helping development is preferential
trade arrangements. These arrangements are critical as a commercial
policy solution to the seemingly intractable problem of economic devel-
opment for the poorest countries of the world. The willingness of the
EC (or of any developed economy) to grant the former Communist
Bloc preferential trading arrangements suggests the universal value of
developing the under-developed.50
The Community's policy of granting trade preferences is most
closely linked to the group of third world countries which were former
colonies of the member states. These states are known as the "African,
Caribbean, and Pacific" countries (ACP). ACP countries benefit from
highly preferential arrangements for duty-free importation into the
Community. 1
48. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (ACP states have most favorable
position).
49. See GATT, supra note 13, art. I.
50. KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OR-
GANIZATION 54 (1970).
51. Through the Lom6 Convention, a bilateral agreement between the EC and the
ACP, the Community set up along side a commercial, industrial, agricultural, and fi-
nancial regime, a system of product preferences for the ACP countries when exporting
to the Community. The Convention is really a series of time-bound agreements, the
most recent of which binds the two parties from 1990 to 2000. The most recent Lom6
agreement maintains previous preferences and improves them, creating broader, quota-
free access to the Community for almost all ACP products. See Commission, Lomi IV
(1990-2000): Background, Innovations, Improvements (Commission of the European
Communities, Directorate-General for Information, Communication and Culture) (DE
64 Catalogue No. CC-AM-90-064-EN-C) (March 1990).
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What has become known as the generalized system of preferences
or "GSP" is a less advantageous scheme than what is granted to the
ACP. Nevertheless, it remains far reaching. The Community prefer-
ence program provides for some duty-free imports and some reduced-
duty imports for approximately 130 countries. These advantages are
manifested in the Community through non-discriminatory tariff prefer-
ences for the import of manufactured and semi-manufactured products,
as well as for agricultural products. 2
The Community has enlarged the GSP to include all of the coun-
tries of Eastern and Central Europe currently eligible for aid under the
PHARE program. The advantages cover all major sectors of trade. At
first, the Community offered GSP for only industrial and agricultural
goods and included only Poland, Hungary, and Romania .5  Romania
had been a beneficiary of the GSP regime for several years previ-
ously. 54 However, by 1990 the Community had extended the program
to include the other PHARE countries and incorporated certain other
agricultural and industrial advantages, and some textile preferences.55
There are several aspects to the GSP and its application to the
East Bloc that should be noted. First, all GSP concessions are volun-
tary and unilaterally revocable by the Community. In fact, the Com-
munity see the concessions as temporary and non-binding, and will
withdraw them when the unfavorable conditions that spawned them
subside .5 This puts the Community in a unique position. If it becomes
dissatisfied with the pace or flavor of change within the East Bloc, it
52. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 299 (1990).
GSP is a GATT-authorized general trade preference system for all developing coun-
tries. It. is available to any country that designates itself as a "developing country." But
it is the developed countries that have the final say on which of the "developing coun-
tries" are included in its preference scheme. Frieder Roessler, The Scope, Limits and
Function of the GATT Legal System, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE,
supra note 17, at 72, 81.
53. Council Regulation 3896/89, 1989 O.J. (L 383) 1 (industrial); Council Regu-
lation 3899/89, 1989 O.J. (L 383) 125 (agricultural). Yugoslavia was also included as
a developed country eligible for GSP, but any substantial discussion of Yugoslavia is
beyond the scope of this article.
54. See Council Regulation 3338/80, art. 7, 1990 O.J. (L 352) (EC-Romania
Agreement).
55. Council Regulation 3831/90, 1990 O.J. (L 370) 1 (industrial); Council Regu-
lation 3832/90, 1990 O.J. (L 370) 39 (textiles); Council Regulation 3833/90, 1990
O.J. (L 370) 86 (agricultural); Council Regulation 3834/90, 1990 O.J. (L 370) 121
(agricultural levies within fixed quotas).
56. See, e.g., Council Regulation 3899/89, supra note 53, at 125 (preamble):
"[Tihe temporary and non-binding nature of the system of generalized preferences
means that the offer may be withdrawn wholly or in part at a later stage ..... Id.
i993]
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can use the GSP as a both a carrot and a stick. This is analogous to the
power that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has when deciding
whether to award advanced credit to countries wanting to borrow
money: the countries will get credit only if they submit to the austerity
obligations designed by the IMF.57 Although the Community has not
resorted to these tactics thus far, the potential for this sort of manipu-
lation does exist.
Second, it is not clear whether the GSP is tailored narrowly
enough for the unique situation in Eastern and Central Europe. As pre-
viously noted, the system was originally geared towards the least devel-
oped countries.5 8 These are countries that have per capita Gross Do-
mestic Product's substantially lower than that of the Eastern and
Central European nations. 59 Roads are not a luxury in Czechoslovakia;
they are in El Salvador.
Furthermore, the Community has a unique relationship with the
bulk of GSP participants-the relationship that exists between former
colonials and former colonies." For decades many EC members61 es-
tablished and maintained cultural, religious, political, linguistic, and
economic links with many third and fourth world countries. Even after
removal of the chains of colonial rule, ties between the two groups re-
main. Also fueling the GSP is the feeling of obligation owed by the
former colonials-a special responsibility towards their developing
kin."2
Neither of these conditions (poverty or former colonial status) ex-
ists in the former Communist Bloc. Yet, the Community has extended
GSP to cover Eastern and Central Europe. The fact that GSP is not
closely fitted to the Eastern and Central European states might mean
that they are not receiving the proper trade prescription for their
unique crises. Ironically, many in the Community made the same argu-
ment against a proposal that institutes a "Marshall Plan" type pro-
gram in Eastern and Central Europe. Critics suggested that the Mar-
shall-type Plan should not be slavishly followed in the same fashion as
originally designed. 63 In the same spirit, there should be a new program
specifically designed for the needs of the former Communist countries.
57. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 848-56 (1986).
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
59. See Maresceau, supra note 45, at 16-17.
60. MATHIJSEN, supra note 52, at 296.
61. E.g., Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the U.K.
62. MATHlJSEN, supra note 52, at 296.
63. MERRITT, supra note 3, at 241.
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The Eastern and Central European states are not at the same level of
development as the impoverished third world. They are second world
nations and should receive second world treatment.
Furthermore, extension of GSP to Eastern and Central Europe
should not be allowed to marginalize the poorest countries in their trad-
ing with the EC--economically or philosophically. The Community's
consumer market is large, but limited. If GSP is granted to the closer,
more economically powerful East Bloc, they will be in a position of
exploiting Western markets faster and more thoroughly than the Afri-
cans, Asians, and others. This will undoubtedly affect the standard of
living of the poorest and weakest nations. " Economics is a zero sum
game, where every widget imported into the EC from Eastern or Cen-
tral Europe is at the expense of a widget supplier from an extremely
poor country. From a philosophical perspective, by granting these ad-
vantages eastward, the focus of GSP is obscured along with the pro-
fessed reason for the program. Gone are the obligations owed to the
historically oppressed. Gone are the obligations owed by the very rich
to the very poor.
Admittedly, there are reasons for favoring at least a temporary
extension of the GSP program to the Central and Eastern Europeans.
The Community has a substantial security interest in maintaining sta-
bility in the East. For at least an interim period, GSP would be benefi-
cial for the Eastern and Central European states. Crisis in the East
may produce crisis for the Community. While the Central and Eastern
European nations are not likely ever to become a military threat (ab-
sent a return to the Cold War), there is the threat of massive economic
and social chaos. Collapse in the East would likely cause an exodus of
hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of immigrants. If law and or-
der break down, multitudes of people will pour into the West in search
of jobs, education, housing, and stability.6 5 Such an immigration would
present an unacceptable risk to any country.
Another reason for favoring a temporary extension of the GSP
program is that the Community has narrowly tailored trade arrange-
ments with three of the most important Eastern and Central European
states and is negotiating agreements with the others. These are known
as trade and association agreements.
64. Abdulai, The Opening of the East and its Implications for the South, 6
WEST-OST J. 1, 2 (1990).
65. Romana Sandurska, Reshaping Europe - Or 'How to Keep Poor Cousins in
(Their) Home'.- A Comment on the Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2501,
2503 (1991).
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D. Trade and Association Agreements
The pinnacle of the trade rapprochement between East and West
Europe is the adoption of the trade portions of the association agree-
ments signed between the EC and the nations of Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia. These sweeping trade pacts are revolutionary in their
depth, as well as their direction. However, they are also a continuation
of a policy of trade liberalization started in the early 1960s;66 a rela-
tionship that has unfailingly moved forward over the last thirty years.
In order to understand fully the significance of the association agree-
ments, it is necessary to trace the events leading up to the accords."'
1. Background
The EC's history of trade with Eastern and Central Europe can be
divided into three periods: minimal trade, the normalization of trade,
and association agreements.
a. Minimal Trade-The 1960s and 1970s
As far back as the mid-1960s there were trade arrangements be-
tween the EC members and CMEA members.6 8 Although they were
basic and mostly technical, these trade arrangements represented the
first contact between the Community's membership and the East Bloc
since the start of the Cold War. This contact was significant in light of
the hostile relations between the Community and the Communist
world.69
66. The fact that these negotiations appear erratic could be explained by the in-
ability of the EC-CMEA to negotiate a formal agreement, given that the CMEA did
not have the legal capacity to negotiate and conclude a trade agreement on the behalf
its members. See generally Theodor Schweisfurth, The Treaty-Making Capacity of the
CMEA in Light of a Framework Agreement Between the EEC and the CMEA, 22
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 615 (1985).
67. The review of the quantitative restrictions and the GSP section of this paper
might give the impression that relations with the Eastern and Central Europeans took a
new course only after the revolutions of 1989. However, there existed a move to relax
trade well before the revolutions. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
68. Between 1965-1969 the Common Market concluded various technical ar-
rangements, mostly concerning agricultural exports. Kazimierz Gryzbowski, Note,
Current Development: The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Euro-
pean Community, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 284, 288 (1990).
69. The second edition of the Soviet Handbook on International Economic Orga-
nizations described the European Community as a "governmental-monopolistic union
organized to establish a Common Market . . .to conduct a joint economic and social
policy to create .a military-economic foundation for the aggressive North Atlantic
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Throughout the 1970s there were attempts by both the EC and the
CMEA to open closed trade and communications doors.7 0 The two in-
stitutions had great difficulty reaching an accord.7 1 The lack of an
agreement was underscored by their refusals to recognize each others'
authority to negotiate and conclude on behalf of their constituent mem-
berships.72 However, the EC was able to produce bilateral trade agree-
ments with several Eastern and Central European States. These agree-
ments concerned a variety of products including textiles, steel, sheep,
and goat meat. 3 Nevertheless, there were no formal trade links be-
tween the EC and the CMEA or its members. Only sectoral agree-
ments existed and these involved minimal trade amounts. 4
b. Normalization of Trade-The 1980s
It was not until 1980, when Romania broke ranks with its CMEA
comrades and engaged in a new and aggressive phase of trade relations
with the Community, that there was progress towards real trade coop-
eration. This second stage was an attempt at normalizing relations be-
tween the two trading blocs.7 5 It produced bona fide trade agreements,
unlike the technical or very basic sectoral agreements of the past. Pre-
vious efforts had been frustrated by the hostile relationship between the
two groups. The new agreements, in contrast, were designed to facili-
tate the type of trade one would expect between regional partners shar-
ing common values and histories.
The second generation quickly produced two bilateral agreements:
one between the EC and Czechoslovakia and the other between the EC
and Romania.7 6 The agreements dealt only with industrial products
and did not contain a steadfast commitment to remove the bulk of
quantitative restrictions erected against the state-trading CMEA mem-
Treaty Organization." HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
240 (2d ed. 1962) (in Russian), cited in Gryzbowski, supra note 68, at 285.
70. See generally TRADE RELATIONS, supra note 1.
71. While some accords had been signed between Eastern and Central Europe and
the EC, there were no official relations between the CMEA and the EC until the 1988
Joint Declaration. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
72. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 27, 570, cited in id.
73. EC Commentaries, Trade Relations Eastern Europe 2 (Sept. 3, 1992)
(Coopers & Lybrand) [hereinafter EC Commentaries].
74. Actual trade was very small. The EC's total trade with the seven CMEA
members in 1987 totalled 43.700 million ECU. In that same year the Community's
total trade with Switzerland was a modest 59.400 million ECU. Kennedy & Webb,
supra note 5, at 635-36.
75. Id. at 636.
76. Id. at 643-44.
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bers." In 1981, the Community adopted the EC-Romania Agreement 8
in which the Community reduced the quantitative restrictions on
Romanian products allowed under Romania's Protocol of Accession to
GATT. The agreement also eliminated some of the quotas on "priority
products" immediately, reduced some others more gradually, and set
up a joint committee for negotiating future reductions. 9 As considera-
tion, the Romanians agreed to allow greater imports from the EC
under the same conditions as all GATT contracting parties and to de-
liver their products at "market-related prices," so as to soften the im-
pact of state-produced goods.80 What the agreement did not do was
completely eliminate the Community's discriminatory quantitative re-
strictions, nor did it produce a commitment by the EC to negotiate a
broader commercial cooperation agreement.81
The Czechoslovakia-EC agreement was substantially the same as
the document negotiated with Romania."' These two agreements were
seen as appetizers. By 1984, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary ex-
pressed their intentions to expand the scope of their existing agree-
ments."3 In 1988, the Community negotiated and signed broader trade,
commercial, and economic cooperation agreements, which brought
forth a series of relatively far reaching accords as will be discussed in
the next section. Relations between the EC and the CMEA were finally
formalized via a joint declaration endorsing cooperation in areas of mu-
tual competence.8
77. Id.
78. Council Regulation 3338/80, supra note 54, at 1.
79. See id. at 1-7.
80. Id. at 6; Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 644.
81. These short-falls in the EC-Romania Agreement can be attributed to three
factors. First, the Romanians' aggressive export policy and curbs on internal consump-
tion produced consistent trade surpluses to the disadvantage of the Community. An-
dreas H. Leskovsek, U.S.-Romanian Trade: Foreign Debt, Trade Barriers, and Future
Problems and Prospects, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 71, 77-79 (1989). Second, the
Community placed the Ceaucescu regime's human rights policy under greater scrutiny.
The Community refused to reward a communist torture state with any broad-spectrum
economic relationship. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 644-45. Third, there were
still negotiations underway on an attempt to achieve an EC-CMEA accord. This proba-
bly slowed the development of national level (bilateral or multilateral) agreements. See
U.S. International Trade Commission, INT'L ECON. REV. 6 (June 1989).
82. The most important exception is that only the Romanian accord extended
GSP as part of the agreement. It was the first time this was granted to a CMEA
member.
83. EC Commentaries, supra note 73 at 2.1.
84. Council Decision 88/345/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 157) 34-35; see supra note 2
and accompanying text.
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By October 1990, more than a year after the first Communist gov-
ernments were toppled, the last of these newest agreements was signed
between the Community and Romania, joining those already arrived at
with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the former GDR, the former
USSR, and Bulgaria. 5 This brought an end to the second phase in EC-
CMEA development, finally permitting an opportunity for full trade to
develop between these nations.
The agreements of the second period are important in that they
opened the door for harmonious trade, producing a commitment by
both sides for commercial cooperation. But there are two other advan-
tages that deserve mention. First, the agreements established a timeta-
ble for the elimination of quantitative restriction on exports to the
Community. Second, the agreements created a framework for trade ne-
gotiations in sensitive areas like agriculture.8 6
c. Association Agreements-The 1990s
The dramatic changes in Central and Eastern Europe, coupled
with the mutual desire of all parties to further the evolving relation-
ships, produced the current generation of association agreements.8 7
These association agreements are known as "Europe Agreements."
Three have already been concluded with Poland, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia.
The Europe Agreements are characterized as "mixed agree-
ments." Mixed agreements are accords the Council of Ministers (on
behalf of the EC), the member states of the EC (on its own behalf) and
the respective East Bloc partner must sign.88 Signatures from the indi-
vidual member states are required because the Community can only
sign on behalf of the Community in areas in which the Community has
competence. The Community is competent to represent the member
85. EC Commentaries, supra note 73, at 2.2.
86. Kennedy & Webb, supra note 5, at 645.
87. The actual impetus for the agreements emerged from the European Council
meeting of the 8th and 9th of December 1989, where the member states concluded that
the Community should consider forms of association with the then still crumbling East
Bloc. This consideration was suggested as part of the overall scheme for political and
economic stability. See COM (90) 398 (Commission guidelines for future association
agreements).
88. "They [the association agreements] are all based on Article 238 of the
Treaty." MATHIUSEN, supra note 52, at 293. The relevant portion reads: "The Commu-
nity may conclude with a third country, a union of States, or an international organiza-
tion agreements creating an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations,
common action and special procedure." EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 238.
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states only on issues of commercial policy.89 As discussed below, the
Europe Agreements go beyond commercial policy, and thus, the mem-
ber states must sign and ratify portions of the accord.
Because of the length of time it takes for all of the relevant parties
to ratify a mixed accord, the Community now expedites implementa-
tion of the commercial portions of trade agreements. This process was
accomplished through the adoption of supplementary "interim agree-
ments" that took effect March 1, 1992. An interim agreement is noth-
ing more than a portion of the Europe Agreement, covering those areas
in which the Community is competent to act without ratification by
each EC member state. It prevents the non-trade related portions of
the greater agreement from delaying implementation of the critically
important commercial aspects of the treaty.
2. Content and Substance
The current trade agreements are distinguishable from previous
ones because their scope is significantly more far-reaching. The Europe
Agreements look beyond a trade policy geared towards achieving nor-
malization and instead look toward some level of integration.
The Community's stated objective regarding these agreements is
to create a stable environment for political and economic growth within
the context of a free marketplace of products and ideas.' 0 This objec-
tive reflects the three goals of virtually all coordinated assistance to the
Eastern and Central European states: the promotion of market econo-
mies, stability, and democracy. Each goal contributes to create a cli-
mate that will enable the Community to access larger markets.
There are limits to what the Community will do to allow access to
its markets by the former East Bloc. For example, the Community will
not completely integrate the Eastern and Central European nations
through membership in the Community. 1 Integration, however, is the
ultimate goal of the three Central European states that have signed
89. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 113.
90. See Eur. Parl. Doc. (DOC EN\RR\105815) 11 (1991) (Report of the Com-
mittee on External Economic Relations on a General Outline for Association Agree-
ments with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe) (A3-0055/91) [hereinafter
European Parliament].
91. Mark Maresceau, General Introduction: The New Association Agreements in
the Framework of the European Community's External Policy (Draft). Seminar: The
Implementation and Prospects of the New Association Agreements between the Euro-
pean Community and Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 4 (Brussels: Dec. 17,
1991) (author has copy on file) [hereinafter General Introduction].
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Europe Agreements.9" Each of their respective accords includes a
clause stating that the associated country's ultimate objective is to join
the Community.9" The Preamble to the EC-Hungary agreement pro-
vides an example:
[T]he final objective of Hungary is to become a member of the
Community and that this association, in the view of the parties,
will help to achieve this objective.94
These clauses demonstrate two points: 1) that the outside countries de-
sire membership in the Community and 2) both sides agree that associ-
ation is a step in that direction. Some find the incorporation of these
points to be a politically important.95 However, much stronger language
was included in the EC-Turkey Association Agreement," and Turkey
is not considered to be close to Community membership. At most, one
could argue that the clause is reference to the distant goal of member-
ship, not a precursor to inevitable membership.97 One should not over-
state the significance of such hortatory declarations, nor underestimate
the savvy of Community negotiators.
All three agreements cover four key areas: political cooperation;
trade of goods; movement of persons, services, and capital; and eco-
nomic, cultural, and financial cooperation.9"
a. Political Cooperation
The agreements call for political dialogue, including meetings at
the highest level with regard to issues of mutual interest.99 This dia-
logue is designed to provide greater continuity in the relationship be-
tween the parties with regard to matters between the two countries, as
well as to matters that involve third parties.100
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. European Community-Hungary Europe Agreement (author has copy on file)
[hereinafter Hungary Europe Agreement].
95. General Introduction, supra note 91, at 4.
96. Council Decision 64/372, 1964 O.J. 3987.
97. Sandurska, supra note 65, at 2505.
98. General Introduction, supra note 91, at 3.
99. See, e.g., European Community-Poland Europe Agreement, arts. 2-5 (author
has copy on file) [hereinafter Poland Europe Agreement].
100. Commission, Information Note, The European Community (EC) and the
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic (CSFR), Bulgaria and Romania (annex 2) 2 (Mar. 10, 1992) (DG I
- E - 3) (final) (author has copy on file) [hereinafter Information Note].
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This provision is the first time that an association agreement in-
cluded political cooperation. 10 1 Political dialogue between the two par-
ties on issues of regional or international importance creates an oppor-
tunity for the Community to use its economic influence as a persuasive
tool for forging a common approach. It is not overly cynical to suggest
that political cooperation is yet another tool to steer the destiny of
Eastern and Central Europe away from Brussels.
b. Free Movement of Goods
The agreements treat industrial and agricultural products differ-
ently, utilizing a more liberal approach for industrial products. A pref-
erential treatment scheme for the associated states and free trade zones
are to be established over a ten year period. 102 The governing principle
is "asymmetrical reciprocity;" the Community must concede trade ad-
vantages over the short and medium-term, while Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia liberalize trade over the medium- and long-term. As a
result, on the first day of the agreement, approximately sixty percent of
the Community's imports from the three countries will enter duty free.
All remaining quantitative restrictions are to be eliminated within five
years,102 except for the barriers on textiles which will be removed in six
years.1 0 '
Providing early trade advantages to the associated countries in the
industrial sector is wise policy. With respect to industrial products, the
Community is in a position to provide early advantages to the three
Central European countries by opening up its markets.1 0 5 The indus-
trial sectors are where the Community is strongest and in the least
need of protection. Coupled with the fact that the former Communist
states are relatively poor, inefficient, and economically decades behind
the Community, the inescapable conclusion is that the transition from
asymmetrical to symmetrical trade relations can best be achieved by
giving the associated countries a chance to adapt to both the free mar-
ket system and economic integration.
Agricultural trade is based on a greater degree of harmony and
reciprocity than industrial trade. While the association agreements rec-
101. See General Introduction, supra note 91, at 5. Maresceau notes that this is
the first time that article 238 has been used in conjunction with political cooperation
with third states. Id.
102. See, e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 7.
103. Id. art. 13.
104. The accords also consolidate the GSP and quantitative restriction liberaliza-
tion previously achieved.
105. European Parliament, supra note 90, at 28.
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ognize the relaxation of the specific and non-specific quantitative re-
strictions of 1989-1990, the new regime calls for gradual liberalization
on a quid pro quo basis by providing immediate access for some East-
ern and Central European agricultural products.le However, the asso-
ciated countries are given immediate access to Western markets under
existing Community quota and tariff ceilings.10 7
The Community's sensitivity in the agricultural sector is clearly
manifested in the agreement.10 8 In light of the difficulties facing the
Common Agricultural Policy, not much can be required from the EC
in this sphere.1 09 Nonetheless, because gradual entry into Community
markets by way of annual quotas is particularly important to the asso-
ciated countries, the Community so provides.
Nevertheless, even the modest concessions on agriculture are sub-
ject to an "escape" clause. Notwithstanding any of the provisions pro-
viding greater access to its market, the Community can, upon the per-
ception of a "serious threat" to the market, take whatever measures
necessary to protect itself, pending successful consultations between the
parties to resolve the problem. 10
The agreements also lay out common principles applying to all
goods covered. Four of those stand out. First, there is a "stand-still"
clause blocking the introduction of any new barriers. This includes all
forms of direct or indirect barriers-customs duties or equivalent
charges, product discrimination, tax discrimination. Not surprisingly,
there is a corresponding exception, at least for the three Central Euro-
pean countries. They are "allowed to derogate exceptionally from the
standstill clause in order to protect, under strict conditions, their infant
industries and sectors in restructuring." ''
Second, there is a non-discrimination clause--one of the most im-
portant aspects of any free trade arrangement. The non-discrimination
clause prevents either party from taking any action of an internal fiscal
nature that discriminates for or against another party.112 The clause
also prevents the use of internal tax refunds to "subsidize" national
106. See, e.g., Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 94, art. 20.
107. Id.
108. See EEC TREATY, supra note 9, arts. 38-47.
109. The Community's sensitivity in the agricultural realm is classically illus-
trated through the ongoing failure to achieve agreement in the Uruguay Round of the
GATT. The Community is reluctant to stop subsidizing its food producers. See
Dodwell, Trade Talks Fall on Deaf Ears, FIN. TIMES, 2 Apr. 1992, at 14.
110. See, e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 21.
111. Information Note, supra note 100, at 2 (annex 2).
112. See, e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 28; cf. EEC
TREATY, supra note 9, art. 95.
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producers. 118
Third, there are anti-dumping provisions in each of the accords.
The anti-dumping provisions protect all parties from unloading prod-
ucts cheaply to force competitors out of the market.' 14 If a party finds
that another is dumping, then the party may defend itself via the pro-
cedures laid down in the agreements and the GATT." 5 The goal of
both parties in resolving dumping problems is to find a solution that is
mutually acceptable, with priority given to solutions that least disturb
the functioning of the accords.'1 6 This goal is significant because the
inclusion of the Community's anti-dumping regulations into the agree-
ment implies the end of state-trading treatment toward the associated
countries. 117
Fourth, the agreements contain protocols on the rules of origin, in
order to prevent the introduction of non-indigenous products. Among
other things, the rules define "originating products" and determine
what products fall under the agreements. The rules also provide for
methods of administrative cooperation to insure smooth implementa-
tion. The regulation of product origination is important in these partic-
ular agreements because there is no common customs union. The
agreements allow free movement for only those products originating in
an associated country. Products from third countries are not free to
move about without restriction. By contrast, under a customs union
scheme anything admitted into the economic space may move freely,
regardless of origin.
This omission of a common customs union distinguishes the as-
sociations between the Community and the Central European states
from previous association agreements concluded with Greece, Turkey,
Malta, and Cyprus, all of which incorporated custom unions. This
omission can be seen as a further indication of the EC's unwillingness
to take steps suggesting future accession to the Treaty of Rome." 8 Fur-
113. Cf. EEC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 96.
114. The agreements apply to dumping as defined in the GATT: where the prod-
ucts of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than
the normal value of the products. See GATT, supra note 13, art. VI(I).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 94, arts. 29, 33.
117. General Introduction, supra note 91, at 6.
118. Id. The Community's refusal to establish similar customs unions with Po-
land, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia can be seen as an attempt to further distance the
EC from the prospects of admitting the associates as full members in the Community.
In other words, if there is no customs union then there certainly is no EC membership.
However, Professor Maresceau does note that not all countries that have acceded to the
Community had an intermediate customs union step. The U.K., Denmark, Spain, and
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thermore, this omission could be explained by the lack of parity be-
tween the EC's economy and the three associated states. There is likely
a realization that the Central European states might become economic
vassals of the Community under the large and complex body of Com-
munity commercial rules."'
c. Movement of Persons, Services, and Capital
The agreements have included chapters on the movement of work-
ers, the right of establishment, and the supply of services in the partici-
pating states. Regarding workers, the rule is that only those Polish,
Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian citizens already legally established in
the Community may remain and be free from discriminatory treat-
ment.120 There is no right of entry to the Community for the Central
European states and there is no right to employment. The agreements
offer only hollow declarations calling for an increase in worker access.
While these declarations encourage improved access to employment in
the Community, they are subject to each member state's assessment of
its own labor market.1 21
This leaves each member state with the power to determine the
number of Poles, Hungarians, and Czechoslovaks that will be able to
move to its state and work. There is little hope that the member states
will favorably consider employing Central European workers. The re-
cent rise of xenophobia and anti-foreigner attitudes, fuelled by rela-
tively high levels of unemployment in parts of the Community, strongly
suggest that there will be little access to jobs in the West.1 22
There is some hope for access to employment in the medium-term.
After the first five years of association, the parties are stated to meet
and make recommendations for improving worker movement and ac-
cess to Community jobs. While this does not guarantee anything re-
sembling the free movement of workers, it at least creates the possibil-
ity that the almost insignificant worker's movement language currently
Portugal had no customs union prior to accession. In fact, only Greece has evolved
from a common customs tariff regime to membership in the EC. Id.
119. See id. at 7. However, the Community does include in the association agree-
ments the basic corpus of Community competition laws. See supra notes 117-18 and
accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 37(1).
121. Id. art. 41.
122. Note that there is only one existing association agreement that explicitly re-
fers to free movement of workers: the EC-Turkey Association Agreement. General In-
troduction, supra note 91, at 9. For a review of the recent rise of fascism in Western
Europe see Europe's New Right, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 6-11.
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in the agreements will be improved.1 23
The right of establishment also is found in the association agree-
ments. "Establishment" in the context of the accords is the right of
nationals of either the Community or the associated countries to take
up and pursue economic activities as self-employed persons." 4 The
term "persons" includes both legal and natural entities, which means
the agreements tolerate companies, professional firms, and any self-em-
ployed entrepreneurs-from inventor to plumber.
The general rule is that each party must provide national treat-
ment to the companies and the nationals of each of the other coun-
tries."'25 The scheme that is set up is similar to that set up for the move-
ment of goods. There is an asymmetrical opening of markets to each
others' establishments. The Community must open itself to the three
Central European republics immediately by not discriminating in favor
of its own establishments. The associated countries, by contrast, may
reciprocate over a transitionary period of up to ten years for some sec-
tors, while other sectors must be made available to Community busi-
nesses immediately. For sectors that are gradually opened, the agree-
ment imposes a "stand-still" requirement preventing the introduction of
any new discriminatory regulations or measures for most types of es-
tablishments. However, there is an exception to the stand-still require-
ment which allows the associated countries to derogate during the tran-
sitionary period and discriminate in favor of certain restructuring
projects, sensitive markets, or newly emerging industries.
The supply of services and capital also are incorporated in the Eu-
rope Agreements. The supply of services is to be applied progressively,
using the same transitionary period used throughout the accord.'2 6 The
parties agree to take the steps necessary to facilitate the supply of ser-
vices in all participating countries. These steps include a limited "free"
movement of persons, but only for those whose services necessary in the
Community. The services envisioned are those required to facilitate im-
ports and exports in the Community. For example, international trans-
port services and the production of sales support systems throughout
the common economic space will likely increase.
As for capital, the agreements undertake to authorize, in freely
123. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 42.
124. See EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art 52. The Treaty defines the right of es-
tablishment in the EC. "Freedom of establishment shall include the right to [take up
and pursue] activities [as self-employed persons and] to set up and manage [undertak-
ings], in particular companies [or firms] .... Id.
125. General Introduction, supra note 91, at 11.
126. Id. at 11-12.
REVIEW OF MARKET ACCESS
convertible currency, any "balance of payment" disbursements con-
cerning goods, services, or persons of the Community of an associated
state.12 7 The agreements also protect the free movement of capital nec-
essary to facilitate direct investment. 128
The Community took a new step in these most recent association
agreements. The accords incorporate a competition chapter in each of
the respective texts. Articles 85, 86, and 92 of the Treaty of Rome are
effectively made part of Central Europe's laws as they relate to trade
with the EC. Although the Central European states are spared from
complying with the accords' competition rules for the first five years,1 29
the imposition of those principles will be painful for several reasons.
For example, aside from the basic problem associated with the
complexity and size of the Community's competition policies, the asso-
ciated countries will need to create bodies of laws in compliance with
those rules. 3 ' Further, there are probably few Communist trained
economists and lawyers with the expertise necessary to contend with
the army of competition lawyers in Brussels when disputing and resolv-
ing potential disagreements. Sadly, it might be that very lack of exper-
tise that allowed the Community's competition rules to find their way
into the three treaties. An incomplete understanding of the nuances of
competition law would explain the ease with which the Community
negotiators persuaded their counterparts to capitulate.
d. Economic, Cultural, and Financial Cooperation
A major objective of the agreements is to enable the associated
countries to transform their economies throughout the transitionary
phases of the agreements. 131 To that end, the agreements embrace poli-
cies designed to bring about the economic and social development of
the Central European partners. Economic cooperation is multi-levelled.
It involves industrial initiatives improving priority areas through pro-
moting favorable investment climates, and embracing scientific and
technological development. It includes agriculture, energy, nuclear en-
ergy, environmental policy, telecommunications, transport, banking, in-
127. See, e.g., Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 99, art. 59.
128. General Introduction, supra note 91, at 12.
129. The agreements allow the associated countries to invoke the equivalent of
article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty of Rome as a prophylactic against the competition rules
of the agreement during a transitionary period. Article 92(3)(a) allows for the giving of
aid to promote development for the underdeveloped. See EEC TREATY, supra note 9,
art. 92(3)(a).
130. See General Introduction, supra note 91, at 8.
131. Information Note, supra note 100, at 4.
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surance, monetary policy, health and safety, tourism, customs, rules,
and more.
As for cultural cooperation, the agreements leave open the possi-
bility of an assortment of cultural programs. This suggests that the
member states of the Community and the. associated countries are free
to create their own-.cultural links. Suggested areas include literary
translations, preservation of historical and cultural monuments and
sites, training of persons working in these fields, and European events
designed to promote the natural links that exist between the parties by
virtue of their common home and history.
Finally, the agreements codify the existing financial assistance pro-
grams that are already applied to the three associated states. These
programs are predominantly the PHARE program and the G-24 coor-
dinated assistance programs. 182
e. Final Considerations
The Europe Agreements cover only Poland, Hungary, and
Romania. Consequently, all remaining Eastern and Central European
countries are subject to only first and second generation trade relations
and the various unilateral measures that have been taken on by the
Community to improve market access and the economic potential of
former CMEA members.
Negotiations are currently underway with Bulgaria and Romania
to advance their relationships with the Community to the (current)
third phase. There is no reason to expect that the same will not occur
eventually with Albania.
Before discussing what is wrong with the association agreements,
something should be said about what is right with them. Two aspects of
the agreements stand out as great achievements. To begin with, the use
of asymmetrical trade liberalization demonstrates their dynamic flexi-
bility. While this gradual process of market access does not extend to
all economic sectors, it does provide some immediate free movement of
goods, capital, and services into the Community. This approach will
allow some "breathing room" for the associated states, while they un-
dertake the transition from planned economies to market economies.
Moreover, the inclusion of the non-trade aspects of the accords should
be applauded. Specifically, the political, cultural and social coordina-
tion enshrined in the treaties uniquely qualifies them as "Europe
Agreements." They serve to acknowledge the inextricably linked pasts
and futures of the two parties.
132. See generally supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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The fundamental drawback of the Europe Agreements is the Com-
munity's refusal to extend future membership to the former Commu-
nist states. It was a mistake to leave open the question of full member-
ship. The agreements should provide clear guidance to the timing of
negotiations on future accession to the Community."'
The arguments against extending membership to Poland, Hun-
gary, and Czechoslovakia, or any former East Bloc country, are based
on conservative pragmatism. Opponents caution against committing to
eventual membership for political and economic reasons."" One could
argue that, politically, in light of the short-comings of Maastricht and
the recent reluctance of some EC members to strengthen their union, it
would be imprudent to discuss a wider union. Many have suggested
that Maastricht demonstrated the fundamental weaknesses of the Com-
munity and that trying to move the Community in too many directions
at once might shake the very foundation of the EC. 33 Others could
argue that, economically, the relatively weak economies of the former
Communist states would make them an unacceptable financial burden
that the Community could not and should not support.' Instead, they
assert that the current regime is sufficient to maintain stability and en-
courage the growth of market economies. 87 This suggests that the cur-
rent agreements, which leave open the possibility of future member-
ship, provide enough impetus for a successful association geared around
a free trade area.
The above arguments are ill-conceived. Gradual free trade coupled
with the possibility of eventual Community membership is not enough.
Such an approach is too slow and indirect, and its incentives for real
change are insufficient. Real change, in turn, is critical to the success of
the experiments in the East. Free trade zones will only succeed if the
partners are of comparable economic strength.138 If not, the weaker
countries cannot compete and will eventually fail. 39 What is needed is
the proper climate to encourage investments and economic prosperity.
Currently, the Central and Eastern Europeans do not have sufficient
capital to do this on their own. They need foreign (Community) capi-
tal. Foreign investors are not confident enough in the markets to invest
133. European Parliament, supra note 90, at 11.
134. See Sandurska, supra note 65, at 2505-08.
135. See id. at 2507.
136. Id. at 2505.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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massive amounts.14 0 The reformation of Eastern and Central Europe
will add another $80 billion (U.S. dollars) to the foreign debt that
these countries already have now. 1 4 The Community can ensure the
success of the pro-democracy revolutions by encompassing Central and
Eastern Europe into the Common Market. This occurred with the for-
mer GDR. In five months the legal framework for its accession into the
Community was complete. The East German political and economic
situation was not so unlike that of the rest of the former East Bloc as to
make them eligible and the rest ineligible.
Furthermore, membership in the Community is desirable for polit-
ical reasons. The political future of the East is not secure. There are
many factions hoping to seize an opportunity to reverse the current de-
mocratization. While the old line Communists are effectively discred-
ited and are unlikely ever to seize power again, the military and old
Communists turned nationalist neo-fascists are ever present. By linking
the political and economic futures of both sides of Europe, the Commu-
nity could further stabilize the situation. This is the lesson of Greece,
Portugal, and Spain-countries that transformed from dictatorships to
democracies and attained EC membership.4 2 It should be conceded
that membership will only be likely, if at all, in the long-term. How-
ever, fault does not entirely rest with Community. It will never be easy
to integrate fully the former communist countries. Reciprocal trade
cannot be implemented in, the short-term. For example, a fully liberal-
ized, financial sector (i.e., free movement of capital) would substantially
disrupt the economies of the integrating states' 43 It could be a decade
before their financial sectors are fully liberalized. Thus, even if mem-
bership were a probability, it could not happen until the next century.
This point is not an argument against membership. It is only an argu-
ment against moving too quickly.
For those who fear the costs of Central and Eastern European in-
tegration into the Community, they should consider the cost to the EC
of the political chaos and mass migration of hungry and oppressed
thousands-maybe millions.14 4 If the worst case scenario comes to frui-
140. Attali, Donning the Prickly Mantle of Free Trade, THE EUROPEAN, Apr. 9-
12, 1992, at 23.
141. Giles Merritt, The EC Can't Afford to Let Eastern Europe Founder, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 7, 1990, at 6.
142. See generally, J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403, 2456 (1991).
143. Commerzbank, Supporting Eastern Europe's Reforms: Is EC Membership
within Reach?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 18-24, 1992, at 68.
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tion, political pundits might one day yearn for the stability and pros-
perity of the Cold War years.

